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Deglobalisation	post	COVID-19	could	spell	trouble	for
the	European	Monetary	Union
The	COVID-19	crisis	led	to	severe	restrictions	in	mobility	across	borders,	concerning	both	individuals	and	goods.
Borders	were	closed,	international	travel	made	almost	impossible,	and	final	and	intermediate	goods	were	unable	to
get	from	one	country	to	another.	Massive	disruptions	of	global	value	chains	were	caused	by	inputs	not	being
manufactured	due	to	lockdowns	or	not	being	delivered.
While	the	situation	is	improving,	it	is	not	clear	what	the	long-run	economic	consequences	of	the	pandemic	are.
Firms	might,	for	instance,	rely	more	on	the	production	of	inputs	within	national	borders	to	be	prepared	for	similar
situations.	Such	hedging	of	risks	might	come	at	the	expense	of	productivity,	as	most	economists	are	aware.	In
addition,	such	a	re-nationalisation	or	de-globalisation	could	interfere	with	monetary	policy	in	the	euro	area	and
severely	trouble	the	functioning	of	the	monetary/currency	union,	which	is	not	well	known.
We	show	why	this	is	the	case	in	a	recent	research	article.	We	use	a	dynamic	macroeconomic	currency	union	model
to	analyse	how	a	currency	union	is	affected	by	the	interconnectedness	of	the	countries	and	how	this	interacts	with
monetary	policy.	We	analyse	the	model	not	only	with	rational	expectations	but	also	with	a	variety	of	behavioural
expectations,	as	rational	expectations	have	many	times	been	attacked	for	their	lack	of	realism.	Which	varieties	of
behavioural	expectations	we	use	is	described	further	below	–	our	main	results	hold	up	with	behavioural	and	rational
expectations	alike.
The	importance	of	economic	integration
We	show	that	the	level	of	economic	integration	is	crucial	for	the	currency	union	to	function.	High	economic
integration	in	the	model	means	that	there	are	few	barriers	to	trade,	so	that	countries	can	and	do	trade	a	lot	with
each	other.	When	countries	trade	a	lot	with	each	other,	this	means	that	the	developments	of	inflation	in	one	country
matter	relatively	much	for	other	countries.	Thus,	in	a	country	currently	in	an	economic	downturn,	inflation	will	be
lower	than	in	other	countries.	Therefore,	prices	in	this	country	will	become	lower	and	its	goods	more	competitive	in
other	currency	union	countries.	If	the	countries	trade	a	lot	with	each	other,	the	effect	of	the	increased	demand
abroad	can	stabilise	prices	in	the	troubled	country.	While	such	a	positive	effect	of	trade	in	currency	unions	is	well
known,	our	article	is	the	first	to	show	this	in	a	multi-country	dynamic	macroeconomic	model	with	rational	and
behavioural	expectations.
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Also,	the	level	of	economic	integration	needed	for	a	currency	union	to	function	increases	with	the	number	of
countries	in	the	currency	union.	That	is,	while	a	currency	union	with	only	a	few	countries	may	still	be	fine	with	a
moderate	level	of	economic	integration,	a	much	higher	level	is	needed	in	a	currency	union	with	many	countries.
There	are	certainly	benefits	to	having	many	countries	in	a	currency	union	(for	instance	no	exchange	rate	risk	for
trade	with	all	the	involved	countries	or	an	advantage	in	becoming	an	international	currency	with	borrowing	privileges
for	the	member	countries),	but	it	is	important	to	know	that	large	currency	unions	need	a	high	degree	of	economic
integration.	However,	the	additional	level	of	economic	integration	needed	with	each	additional	country	decreases
with	the	size	of	a	currency	union.	When	there	are	already	many	members,	there	is	no	need	for	much	additional
economic	integration	when	a	new	member	joins.
The	central	bank	cannot	do	enough:	fiscal	policy	is	needed
Unfortunately,	even	well-conducted	regular	monetary	policy	–	that	is,	appropriate	changes	in	the	monetary	union
interest	rate	–	cannot	improve	the	functioning	of	the	union	if	economic	integration	is	too	low.	The	joint	central	bank
could	still	do	a	lot	of	harm:	too	low	interest	rates	in	a	boom	or	monetary	policy	that	is	not	expansionary	enough
when	the	same	negative	shock	hits	all	countries	(such	as	COVID-19)	would	still	be	problematic.	But	even	if	the
central	bank	reacts	as	best	it	can	with	symmetric	measures,	the	union	will	always	be	in	trouble	if	economic
integration	is	too	low.
The	reason	for	that	is	that	the	central	bank	can	never	set	an	interest	rate	that	is	right	for	all	countries.	Some
countries	may	be	in	a	boom,	while	others	are	in	an	economic	downturn.	In	such	a	case,	the	interest	rate	that	is	set
for	the	currency	union	as	a	whole	is	too	low	for	the	countries	in	the	boom	and	too	high	for	the	countries	in	the
slump.	This	suggests	that	fiscal	policy,	which	is	conducted	at	the	country	level,	is	an	indispensable	macroeconomic
stabilisation	tool.	Useful	fiscal	policy	would	not	have	to	be	directed	by	currency	union	authorities,	but	there	would
have	to	be	enough	leeway	for	the	individual	countries	to	conduct	counter-cyclical	fiscal	policies.	This	could	happen
in	coordination	with	the	other	countries	or	following	joint	rules	at	the	union	level,	as	long	as	these	rules	are	not
simple	debt	limits	as	the	current	EU	rules	(the	countries	must	also	be	able	to	finance	counter-cyclical	fiscal	policies
–	there	are	several	ways	to	make	sure	that	they	are	able	to	do	so	in	times	when	additional	spending	is	useful,
including	eurobonds	or	outright	debt	monetisation).
Why	use	behavioural	expectations?	Realism	and	prediction	performance
Why	is	it	important	to	use	behavioural	models	of	expectation	formation?	As	the	results	are	qualitatively	similar
under	rational	and	behavioural	expectations,	wouldn’t	the	model	with	rational	expectations	be	enough?
First,	that	the	results	are	qualitatively	similar	became	only	clear	after	analysing	the	model	with	both	rational	and
behavioural	expectations.	This	is	by	no	means	a	trivial	result,	as	rational	and	behavioural	expectations	often	lead	to
(also	qualitatively)	very	different	results.
Second,	rational	expectations	have	been	criticised	so	heavily	for	their	lack	of	realism	that	it	seems	important	not	to
base	economic	findings	exclusively	on	them.	Indeed,	rational	expectations	place	extraordinary	demands	on	the
ability	of	economic	agents.	Rational	expectations	require	that	agents	know	all	equations	determining	economic
outcomes	and	possess	the	computational	ability	to	calculate	the	solutions	of	such	equations,	an	impossible	task	in
the	real	world.
While	most	economists	acknowledge	that	people	neither	know	the	equations	governing	the	economy	nor	engage	in
higher	mathematics	when	making	economic	decisions,	some	macroeconomists	believe	that	mistakes	in	expectation
formation	should	somehow	average	out.	Believing	in	such	averaging	out	makes	expectation	formation	a	black	box,
completely	eliminating	any	meaning	from	the	so-called	microfoundations	that	ground	aggregate	economic
behaviour	in	individual	decisions.It	is	in	general	also	wrong,	because	expectations	of	different	people	are	not
uncorrelated.
The	behavioural	variants	that	we	use	go	from	a	very	simplistic	model	—	where	people	naively	use	the	last
observation	as	expectation	—	to	a	sophisticated	evolutionary	learning	model	that	performed	well	to	describe
individual	expectations	in	other	work	(e.g.,	here	and	here).	In	this	evolutionary	learning	model,	people	use	relatively
simple	rules	to	forecast	future	variables,	such	as	extrapolating	past	trends	or	thinking	that	variables	will	slowly
return	to	a	long-run	average.	However,	agents	are	not	stupid,	they	learn	from	the	past:	people	rely	more	often	on
the	forecasting	rules	that	performed	better	in	the	recent	past.
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We	believe	a	good	way	to	compare	different	models	is	to	assess	their	prediction	performance.	Models	that	perform
better	out	of	sample	are	in	general	more	convincing.	While	we	do	not	perform	a	full	estimation	of	all	model
parameters	in	our	paper	(which	would	be	an	interesting	topic	for	an	empirical	paper),	we	compare	the	prediction
performance	of	the	models	with	rational	and	behavioural	expectations	on	the	basis	of	parameter	estimates	from
other	work.	Figures	1	and	2	show	the	mean	squared	one-quarter-ahead	prediction	errors	of	the	two	types	of	models
for	inflation	and	for	the	output	gap.	As	can	be	seen,	both	inflation	and	output	gap	are	predicted	much	better	by	the
behavioural	model	for	all	countries	(relying	on	the	evolutionary	learning	model	for	behavioural	expectation
formation).
Figure	1.	Mean	squared	errors	of	one-quarter-ahead	predictions	for	inflation
Notes:	The	data	used	for	Figures	1	and	2	are	year-on-year	percentage	changes	of	the	HICP	for	inflation	and	data	as	described	 here
for	the	output	gap	(from	1999	to	2014).
Figure	2.	Mean	squared	errors	of	one-quarter-ahead	predictions	for	the	output	gap
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Notes:	The	data	used	for	Figures	1	and	2	are	year-on-year	percentage	changes	of	the	HICP	for	inflation	and	data	as	described	 here
for	the	output	gap	(from	1999	to	2014).
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Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	The	behavioral	economics	of	currency	unions:	Economic	integration	and	monetary
policy	(open	access).
The	post	expresses	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School
of	Economics.
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